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Following the first wave of 
the Covid-19 pandemic early 
this year, the healthcare 
crisis in Asia is now centered 
on the policy responses 
being taken by individual 
governments, tailored to 
the different challenges 
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the WoRLd is at an inflection point with the 
Covid-19 outbreak, which has unleashed the 
most challenging international public health 
crisis in living memory. the accompanying eco-
nomic shutdowns induced a global economic 
contraction with an immediate and catastrophic 
impact on demand, supply and financial liquid-
ity. national and global leaders have been dealt 
a serious stress test in the face of this invisible 
enemy. non-traditional security issues like Covid-
19 demand an unprecedented level of global col-
laboration among state and non-state actors. 
Regrettably, what remains truly global is the 
virus itself, which does not respect any bounda-
ries. With the return of intensified great power 
rivalries, multilateralism has given way to unilat-
eralism. in the absence of global leadership, states 
have pursued their narrowly defined self-inter-
est by adopting a number of trade and investment 
restrictions, and divergent policy approaches. 
Calls to roll back globalization and economic 
interdependence are growing stronger in devel-
oped countries. exclusionary nationalist attitudes 
and beggar-thy-neighbor policies have returned 
to the global political stage with a vengeance.
the global pandemic has already altered the 
world as we know it, but the long-term conse-
quences of unrestrained power competition and 
parochial nationalism will have further-reaching 
implications than the immediate responses by 
countries to the pandemic itself. the deepening 
US-China rivalry had led to particularly strong 
concerns for east Asia, with threats including 
the construction of trade barriers within the 
Asia-Pacific region and a new nuclear arms race. 
China’s diplomacy, meanwhile, has been coun-
terproductive at best, as Beijing has missed golden 
opportunities to prove its commitment to multi-
lateralism. China not only suffered from a global 
trust deficit due to its lack of transparency around 
the initial outbreak of the virus in Wuhan. it also 
lost face with its “face-mask diplomacy” — when 
some of the medical equipment it shipped to for-
eign countries turned out to be defective. Bei-
jing’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” — a term describ-
ing Chinese diplomats’ efforts to defend China’s 
national interests — has backfired, because it has 
focused primarily on propagating the purported 
strength of the Chinese system rather than build-
ing greater multilateral trust. 
Multilateralism is on the wane, embroiled 
in the diplomatic tussle between Washington 
and Beijing. Washington withdrew from the 
World health organization on the grounds of 
the organization’s partiality to China and its 
slow-footed response to Covid-19. Beijing has 
not demonstrated any better leadership in co-
ordinating a multilateral response to the pan-
demic. At the Coronavirus Global Response 
Summit in May, high-level officials from more 
than 50 countries pledged US$8 billion for the 
joint development of coronavirus vaccines. nei-
ther the US nor China showed leadership at the 
summit. Washington did not send a representa-
tive, and Beijing only sent its ambassador to the 
eU instead of Premier Li Keqiang. neither coun-
try pledged any financial support to interna-
tional Covid-19 relief efforts. Far from being the 
G-2 world that was promised at the beginning of 
the 21st century, with the US and China work-
ing together on issues of international impor-
tance, we now live in a G-Zero world marked by 
a global leadership vacuum.2 
in the face of eroding global leadership, poli-
ticians of all stripes are spinning the pandemic 
to their own ends — to promote regime stabil-
escalating tensions between the two titans will 
heighten the already severe dilemma among 
middle power countries such as South Korea, 
which sit uncomfortably between their most sig-
nificant military patron in Washington and their 
largest economic partner in Beijing. 
What impact will the pandemic have on rela-
tions among east Asian countries? how should 
South Korea navigate through this challenging 
time without sacrificing either economic growth 
or military security? And how can countries har-
ness nationalism as a unifying force and a step-
ping stone toward internationalism rather than 
allowing it to serve as a divisive ideology? 
rEturNiNg to past politiCs?
the pandemic arrived at a time when the world 
was already struggling to recover from US-
China trade disputes, growing trade protection-
ism, falling commodity and energy prices, and 
economic uncertainties in europe over Brexit. 
instead of serving as a unifying force, the Covid 
crisis has disrupted the global order developed 
during the 20th century, reversed the process 
of globalization and brought international rela-
tions back to a system of walled cities similar to 
the medieval era.1 the absence of national and 
global leadership has driven states and people 
toward a self-help approach. 
the intensifying power competition between 
the US and China significantly complicates inter-
national efforts to respond to Covid-19. in the 
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the US 
and China worked together at the G-20 to ensure 
that governments did not worsen the crisis by 
engaging in competitive currency devaluation or 
increased protectionism. Yet the trump admin-
istration has shown no interest in maintaining 
America’s traditional role in leading global health 
initiatives, preferring instead to pursue “America 
First” or “American only” policies.
Old Walled Politics or  
New Pandemic Peace?  
Lessons from South Korea
By Seung-Youn Oh
Among the global pandemic’s 
effects is the way it has exposed 
the re-emergence of medieval-
style walled politics, where 
countries reject international  
or regional co-operation  
and retreat into nationalist,  
go-it-alone approaches. 
At the same time, the crisis has 
revealed unusual opportunities 
to forge common approaches 
to battling this invisible enemy. 
South Korea, as a middle power 
that stood out as an early 
success story in the pandemic 
fight, has played an important 
role in countering the politics of 
the past, writes Seung-Youn Oh.
1 Henry Kissinger, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the 
World Order,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2020.
2 Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini, “A G-Zero World: The New 
Economic Club Will Produce Conflict, Not Co-operation,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 90 No. 2 (2011): pp. 2-7. Accessed Aug. 2, 2020.
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ity in authoritarian countries or to win upcoming 
election battles in democratic ones. they play the 
nationalist card and scapegoat others to deflect 
blame about their own handling of the crisis. the 
public jumps on these nationalist bandwagons to 
channel their fears and anxieties, driven by rac-
ism, xenophobia or fear of economic loss. in the 
process, scientists are often sidelined; misinfor-
mation and fake news spread like wildfire, com-
plicating the fight against the pandemic. 
the domestic political considerations driving 
countries’ foreign policy will make the road to 
post-Covid recovery in east Asia much rockier. 
US President donald trump will continue to bash 
China as he heads into a tough re-election cam-
paign. the idea of the “great decoupling” — sepa-
rating the American economy from China — has 
gained traction beyond the likes of Peter navarro, 
the controversial China skeptic who serves as one 
of trump’s economic advisers. US Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo framed the US-China fight as 
the ultimate clash of civilizations in his July 23 
address titled “Communist China and the Free 
World’s Future.” 
China’s President Xi Jinping, meanwhile, will 
not make concessions when the global economic 
shocks have hurt his country’s already debt-laden 
economy and challenged a political system that 
derives its legitimacy from economic perfor-
mance. his vision of a “China dream” involves 
the achievement of Xiaokang — a “well-off 
society” that has doubled its per capita income 
between 2010 and 2020. Xiaokang requires an 
annual GdP growth rate of at least 5.6 percent, 
but China’s economy shrank by 6.8 per cent in 
the first quarter of 2020. this year marks the first 
time Beijing has not set a GdP target since 1990. 
President Xi will be pressured to stabilize China’s 
political and economic situation leading up to 
2021, which marks the centenary of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
risE of a NEw paNdEMiC pEaCE? 
What kind of challenges and opportunities does 
the US-China great-power rivalry hold for east 
Asia? in the post-pandemic world, are we going 
to witness a fundamental readjustment in the 
region’s geopolitical landscape? east Asia has 
been dubbed as “more of an anti-region than a 
community” — where varying political interests, 
stages of economic development and alliance 
politics have hampered regional co-operation.3 
Yet the ongoing fight to save both lives and live-
lihoods calls for closer collaboration and greater 
collective action. As neighbors, China, Japan and 
the two Koreas share a common interest in both 
traditional and non-traditional security issues 
that transcend national boundaries. 
First, north Korea’s nuclear threat is a tradi-
tional security concern that requires a shared 
regional solution. in the early stages of the pan-
demic, Pyongyang marked its busiest month for 
missile launches in the country’s history, with 
a total of eight short-range missile tests con-
ducted in March. Kim Jong Un’s three-week dis-
appearance from public view — coupled with 
exchanges of gunfire across the Korean Penin-
sula’s demilitarized zone in May — further com-
plicate strategic uncertainties.
Second, in terms of the economy, the pan-
demic exposed the dangers of making China 
such an essential link in regional and global 
supply chains. the economic disruptions high-
lighted the national security implications of 
reshoring strategic industries and designing 
redundancy into supply chains. States and firms 
are bound to promote diversified supply chains 
as a result of Covid-19. Yet the most likely change 
will involve further localization and regionaliza-
tion of production rather than de-globalization, 
full-scale reshoring or a great decoupling of the 
economic world between the Anglosphere and 
the Sinosphere. 
chemicals for the manufacture of advanced sem-
iconductors following a 2019 Korean Supreme 
Court verdict in favor of the surviving Korean 
victims of forced labor during Japan’s colonial 
rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945. 
China and Japan’s economic sanctions against 
South Korea ironically ended up demonstrating 
the tight-knit trade and investment ties among 
the three countries. When Beijing placed sanc-
tions against South Korean final goods, it contin-
ued to import intermediate goods (such as micro-
chips and electronic components), which repre-
sented 78 percent of all South Korean exports to 
in fact, developments happening before the 
coronavirus outbreak had prompted South 
Korea to begin the process of economic realign-
ment by strategically pursuing its “China plus 
one” and “Japan-free” strategies to redistribute 
the risks deriving from political tensions in east 
Asia. the “China plus one” strategy was adopted 
in response to Beijing’s all-out economic retalia-
tion against South Korean firms in 2017 follow-
ing Seoul’s decision to install the US-provided 
terminal high Altitude Area defense (thAAd) 
anti-missile system. the “Japan free” strategy 
was a byproduct of tokyo’s export ban on key 
3 Peter Hayes and Kiho Yi, Eds, Complexity, Security and Civil 
Society in East Asia: Foreign Policies and the Korean Peninsula 
(Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2015). Accessed Aug. 2, 2020. 
Facial recognition: Members of the Environmental Health Citizens’ Association of Korea wear coronavirus masks in a 
campaign to prevent the spread of Covid-19 in Seoul in late March. The campaign slogan is ‘Healthy You, Healthy Me, 
Healthy Neighbor, Healthy Family, Healthy Country and Healthy Neighboring Country.’ Photo: Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA
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nese leaders in order to discuss necessary travel 
accommodations and restrictions. Second, South 
Korea did not impose aggressive lockdowns in 
the top-heavy way that China did, showcasing 
the importance of leadership, transparency and 
public-private partnerships. With Korea’s Center 
for disease and Prevention as the national com-
mand center, public and private actors worked 
together on the expedited development of test 
kits and drive-through test stations that set a 
standard that other countries have endeavored 
to follow. the authorities’ commitment to clear 
crisis communication enabled the key actors to 
work together on controlling the epidemic and 
establishing public trust. third, South Korea 
demonstrated its commitment to multilateralism 
by sharing its experiences widely with the World 
Bank, the United nations development Program 
and the organization for economic Co-operation 
and development.5 
South Korea’s internal success in reining in 
the outbreak provided the country’s leaders with 
political space to cultivate a liberal and open ver-
sion of nationalism instead of resorting to the 
nationalist rhetoric that is often used in a time of 
crisis to channel public fear and anger outwards. 
the South Korean people affirmed this approach 
by awarding the ruling party a historic landslide 
victory in the national Assembly elections in 
April, with the country’s highest-reported voter 
turnout in 28 years. With such strong support at 
home, South Korea seized the opportunity to col-
laborate with regional and international actors 
on a range of diplomatic initiatives. President 
Moon called for international solidarity to com-
bat the virus at the G-20 and Who annual meet-
ings, while exchanging phone calls with lead-
ers of 29 countries. Seoul has opened new diplo-
matic channels with African countries through 
bilateral aid and collaboration among infec-
tious disease organizations. President Moon and 
and military threats, human security high-
lights the complex sources of insecurity that 
are transnational in scope and non-military in 
nature. As close neighbors, east Asian coun-
tries have experienced the debilitating trans-
national impact of infectious diseases and nat-
ural disasters together. the Korea-Japan-China 
trilateral Summit, formed in 2008 as a venue 
to address such problems, can be expanded at 
various levels for comprehensive risk reduction 
and collaboration. the need to deal with tradi-
tional and non-traditional security issues in east 
Asia may help transform the concept of regional 
community-building from an elusive dream to 
an achievable reality in the post-pandemic world.
MiddlE-powEr aCtiVisM 
in moving away from the “walled politics” of 
the Covid-19 era, middle-power countries 
should do more to champion multilateralism 
and regionalism. Caught between China’s state 
capitalism and America’s unilateralism, South 
Korea is a middle power that understands the 
mounting dilemma coming from geopolitical 
competition. While great powers define the 
overall contours of the geopolitical landscape, 
middle powers are not passive spectators wait-
ing for their fate to be determined by the sys-
tem-level power game. they are weaker than 
the great powers, but powerful enough to play 
pivotal roles in establishing and maintaining 
the regional balance of power. 
South Korea’s domestic success in combating 
the Covid-19 pandemic has renewed its bona 
fides as a responsible middle power. the coun-
try earned global recognition not just for what it 
did — combating the virus based on the strong 
“3t system” of test, trace, and treat — but also for 
what it did not do. First, South Korea did not place 
a comprehensive travel ban on China and main-
tained close communication channels with Chi-
China. in fact, South Korea’s overall exports to 
China increased by 12.4 percent in 2017 and its 
semiconductor exports increased by 30.4 percent. 
Japan’s export restrictions on South Korea actu-
ally hurt Japanese companies more than Korean 
ones. Japanese companies lost 23 percent of their 
exports during the first 100 days of the dispute, 
while South Korean companies experienced a 
13.9 percent decrease.
China, Japan and South Korea together repre-
sent around 24 percent of the entire world econ-
omy. With a combined yearly trading volume 
of more than US$720 billion, they form one of 
the most integrated economic blocs in the world. 
Post-pandemic economic readjustments could 
provide a golden opportunity to develop tighter 
regional supply chains through near-shoring and 
to co-operate on establishing regional stockpiles 
of key medical supplies. the Japanese govern-
ment rolled out a US$2.2 billion repatriation 
package in April to help Japanese manufac-
turers move out of China, but that is a drop in 
the bucket compared to total Japanese invest-
ment in China. thus, instead of taking an alarm-
ist approach, strategic adjustment in trade and 
investment policies between Japan and China 
should be pursued as “positive-sum” regionali-
zation encompassing Southeast Asia rather than 
“zero-sum” mercantilism. 
the last area for co-operation is non-tradi-
tional security, where east Asian countries can 
work together to prepare for tomorrow’s pan-
demics or other transnational threats through 
multilateral collaboration. in an address mark-
ing the third anniversary of his inauguration 
in May, South Korean President Moon Jae-in 
stressed “human security” that prioritizes peo-
ple’s lives and safety as one of South Korea’s 
main priorities moving forward from the Covid-
19 outbreak.4 Unlike a Clausewitzian concept of 
traditional security that emphasizes state actors 
South Korea’s domestic 
success in combating the 
Covid-19 pandemic has 
renewed its bona fides as a 
responsible middle power. 
The country earned global 
recognition not just for 
what it did but also for 
what it did not do.
First, it did not place a 
comprehensive travel ban 
on China and maintained 
close communication 
channels with Chinese 
leaders. Second, it did 
not impose aggressive 
lockdowns in the top-
heavy way that China did. 
Third, it demonstrated 
its commitment to 
multilateralism by sharing 
its experiences widely.
5 “Tackling Covid-19 Health, Quarantine and Economic Measures: 
Korean Experience,” South Korean government report, March 31, 
2020, at english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd= 
N0001&seq=4868; “Tracking and Tracing Covid: Protecting Privacy 
and Data while Using Apps and Biometrics,” Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Apr. 23, 2020, at  
www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/tracking-and-tracing-
covid-protecting-privacy-and-data-while-using-apps-and-biometrics-
8f394636/; Flattening the Curve on Covid-19: How Korea Responded 
to a Pandemic Using ICT, South Korean government report, May 11, 
2020, at www.undp.org/content/seoul_policy_center/en/home/
presscenter/articles/2019/flattening-the-curve-on-Covid-19.html
4 The concept first gained wide currency through the UN 
Development Program in its 1994 Human Development Report.
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political collaboration. Return to the old walled 
politics is a risky path for all because exclusion-
ary nationalism in the region will further widen 
the cracks that already existed due to unre-
solved historical memories, different regime 
types and alliance politics. 
nationalism is not always a divisive ideology. 
it can be a force for solidarity during a crisis and 
instill a sense of community that is much needed 
in the war against Covid-19. each nation’s 
approach to the pandemic within its own bound-
aries will largely determine whether a nation 
turns inward or outward after the recovery. Gov-
ernments that do the best job defeating the pan-
demic will earn political capital in international 
relations; those that fail will take an adverse turn 
toward protectionism. 
the world needs foresight and united action 
against an invisible and debilitating threat, not 
reactive blame-shifting and myopia. this fight is 
too critical to be subsumed by geopolitical power 
games. it is also bigger than the G2 relationship 
between China and the US. With global leader-
ship in limbo, it is time for middle power coun-
tries to help build a road toward peace.
seung-youn oh is assistant professor  
in the department of political science,  
bryn Mawr College.
seven other world leaders co-authored an opin-
ion piece in The Washington Post to underscore 
their commitment to multilateralism and equi-
table global access to coronavirus vaccines.6 this 
middle power coalition is playing a proactive role 
in offsetting the crippling impacts of great power 
rivalry and pushing back against the rhetoric of 
“with us or against us.” 
As recent sour interactions between Seoul 
and tokyo demonstrate, the ability to manage 
a sometimes testy relationship is an essential 
aspect of middle-power activism. South Korea 
and Japan’s tit-for-tat halt on visa-free entry in 
March hinted at nationalism rearing its ugly head 
due to unresolved historical tensions between 
the two countries. When mutual distrust runs 
high at the state level, sub-national and private 
actors can generate a way to bridge differences. 
For example, the City of Gyeongju in South Korea 
provided medical gear to its Japanese sister cities, 
nara and Kyoto, when the national governments 
in Seoul and tokyo were slow to co-operate due 
to their history of tensions. this kind of public 
partnership below the state level can help take 
Covid-19 diplomacy to the next level — strength-
ening regional co-operation and providing a step-
ping stone away from inward-looking national-
ism and toward greater internationalism. 
CoNClusioN 
We may be standing at the crossroads of a his-
torically decisive make-or-break moment for 
today’s global system of political and economic 
co-operation. history tells us that when coun-
tries pulled up their drawbridges and embraced 
economic nationalism, the result was war, dev-
astation and destruction. the current pandemic 
did not stem from competition between states 
or shifts in the balance of power. Yet politiciza-
tion of the virus and domestic insecurity have 
shaken faith in global economic integration and 
6 Justin Trudeau, Sahle-Work Zewde, Moon Jae-in, Jacinda 
Ardern, Cyril Ramaphosa, Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón, Stefan 
Lofven and Elyes Fakhfak, “The International Community Must 
Guarantee Equal Global Access to A Covid-19 Vaccine,” The 
Washington Post, July 15, 2020. 
